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Abstract:1 
This article seeks to interrogate Don McKay’s body of poetry through the 
lens of his own critical writings, with a particular focus on poems linking 
representations of the nocturnal with his concept of “wilderness,” which 
he defines as the ability of all things to “elude the mind’s appropriations” 
(“Baler Twine” 21).   In McKay’s poetry, night is variously the time of 
shape-shifting, de-materialization, memory, and non-empirical knowledge, 
all of which require a re-investigation of the division between inner and 
outer, memory and experience, and between naming and knowing.  At 
the same time, the article highlights poetic strategies used by an artist 
who loves the natural world as much as, if not more than, the language in 
which he renders it.  As such, the nuances that assert and describe 
“otherness” are sharpened; by the same token, the non-human 
wilderness and the one inherent in human systems of language are 
shown to imply one another.  The uncomfortable space beyond empirical 
knowledge―and beyond the epistemological convenience of a dichotomy 
between self and other that such a mode of knowledge introduces—is 
one that the night forces upon the mind as the latter is reminded of 
“another gravity” that, even if unseen, remains at work.  It is this 
explanation of the other as “another gravity” that informs much of 
McKay’s poetry, and that forms the basis for his critical writings about 
human relationships with the environment beyond mere relationships of 
utility. 
“[…] […] There’s  
a sorrow that’s so old and silver it’s no longer 
sorry.  There’s a place 
between desire and memory, some back porch 
we can neither wish for nor recall.’ 
(McKay, “Song for the Song of the Wood Thrush,” Camber 125, ll. 6-10). 
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In his essay “The Bushtits’ Nest,” Don McKay explores and recreates the experience of 
the Biblical Adam’s task of applying names to the natural world.  Initially brimming with 
enthusiasm and to his great personal satisfaction, Adam assigns names to the flora and 
fauna, honoring God’s “love of code” (91); however, waking in the middle of the night, 
Adam is no longer pleased with his choice of the name “Screech Owl,” among others, 
and now sees the name as a constricting “cage for the bird which could be set down in 
one place or another in the sentence” (91).  Night is the site of Adam’s disillusionment 
with the imprecision of nomenclature, with him realizing that, under the auspices of the 
lunar, the nocturnal invades diurnal reality and wilderness invades language.  The 
darkness reveals an unfamiliar, mutable side of the natural world not visible at the time 
of naming, and a bewildered Adam wonders “Would the whole ceremony have to be 
done again under the moon’s changing eye?  Would everything have to have a day 
name and a night name?” (91).  In Don McKay’s poetry, night is variously the time of 
shape-shifting, de-materialization, memory, and non-empirical knowledge, all of which 
require a re-investigation of the division between inner and outer, memory and 
experience, and between naming and knowing.   
Night undermines the exactitude of definition and reminds us that there is a point at 
which categories become obscured, even eclipsed, and that while the mind may try to 
drape itself over the external world, there is a kind of wilderness in everything which 
resists transmission.  Don McKay has described this inherent space beyond time and 
memory as “[…] a loneliness/which must be entered rather than resolved,[…]” (“On 
Leaving,” Camber 201, ll. 20-21).  In the same way that the moon illuminates the night, 
McKay’s poetry operates like night vision (Michaels 180),2 and while not attempting to 
de-code the nocturnal or the wild, his verse demonstrates that they can be commented 
on and interacted with meaningfully and ethically by entering this space beyond memory 
and desire. McKay’s definition of “wilderness,” which will be used throughout the 
discussion, is “not just a set of endangered spaces, but the capacity of all things to elude 
the mind’s appropriations” (“Baler Twine” 21).  This paper seeks to link the 
representations of the nocturnal in McKay’s body of poetry with his formulation of 
“wilderness” as a space beyond utility, and it also highlights how his poetry articulates its 
subject matter without appropriating it.  Relying on the phenomenological insight that the 
perceiver is inextricably part of the perceived,3 the following exploration of the nocturnal 
in McKay’s poetry tries to articulate a distinctive understanding of wilderness, and by 
extension, of how ethical relationships are to be established with it. 
Eclipse, Nightmare, and Shape-shifting: The Dark Side of the 
Moon 
The exploration of the nocturnal is a recurrent one in McKay’s work, as exemplified by 
the titles of two of his poetry collections, namely Sanding Down This Rocking Chair on a 
Windy Night (1987) and Night Field (1991). Spanning his entire career, this focus on the 
nocturnal can also be found in other collections such as Birding, or Desire (1983) and 
Another Gravity (2000), with individual poem titles like “Fridge Nocturne” (Camber 10), 
“Dusk” (Camber 6), “Pausing by Moonlight Beside a Field of Dandelions Gone to Seed” 
(Camber 35), “Dark of the Moon” (Camber 165), “Before the Moon” (Camber 174) and 
“Nocturnal Migrants” (Camber 178)  Often in McKay’s work, day is the time for naming, 
viewing, classifying, creating order, and, as described in “Twinflower” (Camber 110-112), 
implementing the “[…] bright/reticulated snaps of system” (Camber 111, ll. 39-40).  
Night, however, corresponds to a force that obscures that which was clearly visible and 
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thus empirically classifiable by day, often complicating the unerring faith in human 
reason that is engendered by these organizing activities.  This description of night reads 
in close keeping with what he describes elsewhere as the “wilderness” inherent in all 
things natural and man-made.  A telling point of intersection in McKay’s poetry is one at 
which a human mind, clinging to its categories, fears, and concepts of duality, 
encounters the unfamiliar, the wild―and at times the chaotic—in the form of the night.  
And when the mind tries to establish order and domination over the darkness which 
eclipses it, tyranny ensues. 
In “Nocturnal Animals” (Camber 9), the speaker introduces the issue of consumption by 
describing how “[…] Southern Ontario/ surrounds this kitchen like well-fed flesh” (ll. 1-2), 
the wilderness figured in terms of its suitability for slaughter.  The poem also speaks well 
to this human-order/wilderness-disorder dichotomy by situating the human in the centre, 
recalling if not invoking the worldview of humanism.4  After musing about how if he or 
she had a cigarette, he or she would “[…] smoke it like an angry campfire/ burn it into the 
unblemished body of the night,” the speaker delves into a story in which a pack of 
wolves “took shape” in a town called Lobo, named after a species of small wolves that 
has been nearly decimated due in part to over-hunting.  The description of the wolves 
not as simply appearing or emerging from the darkness, but as taking shape relates to 
the association of night with shape-shifting and with terror.  Alanna F. Bondar writes: 
“stories of human-animal mutations, particularly those transformations that occur at 
night, imply a cultural fear of wilderness and the human wilderness link completed only 
in nightmarish vision” (79).  Not only do people fear wilderness in and of itself, they also 
dread the possibility of being taken over by it; night, as described here, is a site of 
sublimation, disintegration, and terror.   
Enticed by the smell of “[…] an automated pig barn/waiting for them like an all-night 
restaurant” (Camber 9, ll. 22-23), the wolves naturally leave Lobo, “[…] lifting the 
tombstone of its name” (Camber 9, l. 17).  Connected with the later description of the 
wolves as “spectral,” implying a ghostly and immaterial presence, the image of the 
tombstone opening so that they can emerge also links up with the animals’ haunting of 
the speaker with a reminder of the atrocity of the species’ near-extinction.  Unfortunately, 
the pig barn associated with the human convenience of an all-night restaurant leads the 
wolves to their death, and as a result of human contact, they are “Shot,/their bodies 
wisped away, […]” (Camber 9, ll. 25-26), and dematerialized.  The ethical impetus of this 
dissolution of form points to a tendency to minimize environmental concerns in the sense 
that if something is immaterial, it does not have to be protected or even considered.5   
Playing with the stock trope of death as eternal night and endless sleep, the title 
“Nocturnal Animals” implies that the wolves are not just literally nocturnal, but are also 
figuratively so because they are dead. By extension, the night imposed by humans is 
one of violence and death, not of regeneration, transformation or union.  The decimation 
of the Lobo population adds another dimension to the title because it is not just a few 
wolves in particular that have been killed―the species as a whole has entered the dark 
night of its existence.  In contrast to the human impulse to “automate” (Camber 9, l. 17), 
modify and build, the wolves’ only action was that of being animal and following their 
nature in an attempt to survive.  McKay is not necessarily even suggesting that it was 
wrong for the farmer to protect the source of his/her livelihood, or stating that it was 
indeed a farmer that shot the wolves at all; he does, however, point out a serious flaw in 
a biotic system that results when consideration of the wild is not included.  The poem 
ends by describing the wolves’ eyes as “stubbed out,” connecting with the earlier image 
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of the cigarette the speaker imagines burning into the night.  The action of stubbing out 
indicates the power to extinguish or destroy, which demonstrates that the distribution of 
power between the shooter and the wolves is not equal, and even if both human and 
wolf are attempting to meet the same survival-oriented needs, it follows from the logic of 
the poem that the ability to “stub” life out requires a careful exercise of this power.   
The (In)visible: Night-vision, Appropriation, and X-Ray 
Besides issues of preservation, another feature of the nocturnal in McKay’s poetry in 
terms of the human negotiation with otherness also implies the exploration of the 
boundary between inner and outer.  Without the reliability of the sense of sight, the 
appropriate way of knowing the world shifts from one that is empirical to one that is 
intuitive (MacKendrick 46).  In “Dusk” (Camber 6), appropriately titled in the sense that it 
indicates a time that is transitional and polymorphous, heaviness is evoked by a lack of 
sight.  In the third stanza of the poem, the speaker remarks: “Shadows sadden./The 
details of your face escape like minnows./We become weight—” (Camber 6, ll. 10-12), 
thereby indicating the increased kinetic sensation that results when sight becomes less 
precise.  Adding to the dark stillness, the alliteration in the line “Shadows sadden” 
hushes not only sound but also thought: it is the sound of the mind drifting away from 
itself.  The overall unhinging of the reliability of the traditional five senses to negotiate the 
night requires what Louis Mackendrick calls “a more elemental form of understanding” 
(46) which privileges feeling over observing.   
Another way in which the inner/outer dichotomy is undermined in McKay’s poetry is by 
illustrating the ability of x-ray to render visible that which was incapable of being seen.  
X-ray subverts the metaphysical tendency “that points to the referential movement from 
the visible to the invisible” (Ricoeur 288), instead making the invisible materialize.6  X-
ray, therefore, like moonlight, reveals the night of the body as, for instance, in “Bone 
Poems” Camber 77-83), where to be x-rayed is to “ […] Moon-bathe” (82, l. 3).  With 
characteristic jest, the speaker in the poem then goes on to liken x-ray to: “[…]peep 
shows that could/melt your skin and show the bones/inside your feet[…]” (82, ll. 6-8), 
describing the resultant image as “[…]an ocean where a loose/family of fish 
was/wriggling in blue spooky light” (82, ll. 10-12).  The speaker thus highlights the fact 
that x-ray, indeed a function of human ingenuity, ironically shows us that there are things 
about ourselves that we do not know and cannot even see.  As the penultimate line so 
purely and simply states: “There are other worlds” (82, l. 13).  The poem then connects 
the images of x-ray, or “moon-bathing,” with pre-historic fish and the dead dog that “ […] 
swims in the earth” (82, l. 14) by means of a lexical set associated with water, at once 
likening the body to an ocean, and again to the earth itself containing the dead dog, an 
earth which, like the foot, houses bones.  McKay effectively creates a poetic ecosystem 
in which interconnection is the primary characteristic, highlighting an interdependent and 
ecologically sound relationship between people and the rest of the natural world.    
One way in which similarity is shown to be an ethically relevant characteristic of nature 
occurs when McKay describes a hawk’s talons as “[…] fine/ and slender as the x-ray of a 
baby’s hand” (Camber 4, ll. 3-4) in “Close-up On a Sharp-Shinned Hawk.” Cleverly 
avoiding the pitfall of anthropomorphic attribution by not comparing the talon to a baby’s 
hand, but to an image of it, the speaker illustrates that humans can understand animals 
and other members of the natural world in terms of human attributes without necessarily 
being appropriative or privileging the human as biologically superior or more evolved.  
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There is, in fact, an ethical imperative to recognize the scaffolding of language and 
human involvement because, as McKay states, “it is as dangerous to act as though we 
were not a part of nature as it is to act as though we were not a part of culture” (“Baler 
Twine” 30-31).  There is nothing wrong with desiring to see the world from a bird’s eye 
view, but as McKay further intimates in his poem “Icarus” (Camber 170-173), this has to 
be done under gravity’s influence by climbing a rock face, opposable thumbs and all.  As 
asserted in the last two lines of the poem, lines in which Icarus anachronistically 
imagines the Hardy Boys and Tom Sawyer in action, “Somehow they will find a way to 
put their brute/heads in the clouds” (Camber 173), but they will do this by human means, 
experiencing the other in a real and thoughtful way: by fully acknowledging the gifts and 
restrictions of our observations and capabilities. 
The Night and Otherness: Phenomenological Navigations and 
Visitations 
Aside from ascending rock faces, McKay’s poetry gestures in loftier directions.  A 
notorious and sincere admirer of all things avian, McKay writes in “Nocturnal Migrants” 
(Camber 178-179) that birds travel “navigating by the stars and the earth’s 
own/brainwaves […]” (178, ll. 15-16), their flight simultaneously directing attention 
upward and earthward, bridging the planetary and the earthly.  This ease of flight, then, 
is facilitated by an ability to incorporate knowledge from both realms, illustrating that the 
acknowledgment of both the logical (or grounded) and the expressive (or lunar) is in fact 
desirable.  The mind’s ability to reach escape velocity and enter direct experience 
without the clutter of its categorical thinking leads to expansion, and suggests that union 
with its stipulated opposite is not threatening, but amenable.  McKay goes on to explore 
the reluctance that accompanies this abandonment of the self.  Darkness for McKay 
does not just represent absence, but also signifies an exit.  In “Dusk,” the speaker 
describes  
the slow 
rollover of evening, the spruce 
growing dense, gathering dark, 
standing in pools of departure.   
(Camber 6, ll. 1-4) 
But departure from what?  It is potentially a departure from conceptions of the self that 
are anchored in the visible and the empirical.  In “Meditation on Snow Clouds 
Approaching the University from the Northwest,” McKay describes such a moment as:  
the cadence where we meet a bird or animal  
to lead us, somehow,  
out of language and intelligence.  
(Camber 106, ll. 17-19)  
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The speaker oscillates between fear of loneliness―or at least fear of entering the 
darkness without a guide—and the irresistible attraction to the other in the form of the 
moon, which “[…]gathered longing into moths/and kept reality from overdosing on its 
own sane/self[…] ” (“Dark of the Moon,” Camber 165, ll. 3-5).  Despite this ambivalence, 
the speaker feels tugged on,, much like moths are intoxicatingly drawn to light.  But 
centripetal force prevents him or her from escaping the pull of the earth and of the mind 
by flying, from existing in the free space beyond them.  
However, one way to buffer the sharp boundary between self and other consists in 
recognizing the space beyond the self as a space that is also human.  The nocturnal 
offers an occasion for the exploration of this space as it literally provides light, but it is a 
light that subverts the categories of the mind.  In “Before the Moon” (Camber 174), the 
speaker states that before nighttime, “[…] Whatever a thing was,/that was it, no ifs 
or/airspace […]” (ll. 9-11), airspace in this case referring not only to flight, but also to the 
desire to explore the zone between two things: between earth and sky, self and other, 
and between the literal and the figurative.  Without the dimension of the night, this in-
between space does not constitute a relevant space of reflection.  There was nowhere to 
go to temporarily elude the self; before the moon, “[…] Place was obese,” “[…] so full of 
itself/there was no leaving home, and so/no dwelling in it either […]” (Camber 174, ll. 11-
14). The self was simply occupied choicelessly due to a lack of alternatives.  For this 
reason, before the moon, “[…] Longing was short/and sedentary […]” (Camber 174, 14-
15). In accordance with the big bang theory of planetary evolution, the moon here refers 
to the chunk of the earth that got away from itself.  According to this logic, the moon 
does not amount to a separate entity but to a part of the earth’s self, the part that is 
missing.   
As “Before the Moon” suggests, inner becomes outer―and thus self becomes other—
when the moon “[…]fisted itself into otherness inside the/body of the earth, bulbed,/broke 
out on its own” (Camber 174, ll. 2-4).  This moment of emergence proves relevant to 
both the creation of poetry and to the creation of intimacy caused by this gravitational 
pull.  Before the moon, the speaker acknowledges, “there was no second gravity and 
no/dark art of reflection,[…]” (Camber 174, ll. 5-6), and as such, each night was identical, 
“[…] and fell formlessly,/with no imagination,/and without you in it” (Camber 174, ll. 25-
27), demonstrating how the same relation applies to interpersonal connections.  By 
figuring night this way, McKay reinscribes the category of wilderness, frequently figured 
as the nocturnal, as a legitimate site of self-knowledge, in fact implying that the boundary 
between inner and outer is fluid if not, at times, non-existent.  The objective is not just to 
reach escape velocity and gain enough momentum to exit the self, but also to subvert 
the mind’s operations enough to get at the sides of ourselves that seem separate and 
remote, to see ourselves as sites where wilderness resides.   
Sinking versus Soaring: Memory and the Present 
In McKay’s poetry, in addition to language, time and memory are other forces that 
oppose the upward movement of unrestricted imagination.  In this regard, time becomes 
collapsed and dispersed by night much in the same way that it is by remembering.  Just 
as empirical distinctions prove necessarily unreliable in the night, in haunting the mind, 
the past obscures the concept of linear time.  Because the content of memory involves 
that which has already taken place—be it thought, experience, observation, or 
utterance—the act of remembering blurs categories of time because though relating to 
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the past, it can, paradoxically, only take place in the present.  This could be described as 
another example of what McKay defines as wilderness, that which has the power to 
elude the mind’s appropriations, in the sense that, in the act of remembering, the past 
and the present “bleed together,” and things already said and done can profoundly affect 
the present.  Memory thus negates the mind’s prefabricated notions of chronology and is 
itself a form of wilderness indigenous to the mind.   
Memory can disturb the surface of the mind’s stillness much in the same way that 
naming functions like the knife that separates the namer from the named.  For instance, 
in “Pausing by Moonlight Beside a Field of Dandelions Gone to Seed” (Camber 35), 
silence and stillness are emphasized by the “absence of owls” (l. 6) and the car that is 
cooling down (l. 4).  Even though “Gossip is dead” (l. 12), the calmness cannot last much 
longer.  In a field full of light and downy, precariously hanging seeds, the speaker 
remarks:  “Your next breath/triggers ten million peccadilloes” (Camber 35, ll. 13-14).7  
Whether breath is being drawn to yawn, speak, or even gasp with wonder, the observer 
cannot experience the scene without affecting it in turn.  In this sense, breath is much 
like thought, as both can be kept at bay and temporarily withheld, but will inevitably and 
involuntarily kick back in. 
On the other hand, birds are creatures of present time in McKay’s poetry, often opposing 
the forces of regret and loss occasioned by reflection.  McKay describes this 
phenomenon directly in “Hover” when he writes that the bird,  
[…] pissing off both 
gravity and time, 
refusing to be born into the next 
inexorable instant […]  
(Camber 187, ll. 9-13) 
exists only in the present, in the space between past and future, between flight and 
freefall.  The song of birds also lifts the speaker to a place beyond time and memory, in 
this case by means of sensory stimulation.  In “A Toast to the Baltimore Oriole” (Camber 
22), the bird’s song situates the speaker in present time by soothing him or her out of 
language, never dealing with “[…] what is past,/ or passing, or to come” (ll. 5-6).  The 
experience of the bird’s song evades loss because it can never pass, it can only be, as it 
does not comment on or contribute anything in terms of content that is not equally part of 
the form of the song.  This is a site at which the human search for “meaning” enters the 
wilderness of the present and begins to collapse, both as a result of the assumed 
separation of form from content, and from the assumption that all “content” that is 
intelligible must be capable of formal encapsulation to be made “systematically 
meaningful” (Dickinson 37).8  The song, as such, does not “mean” anything, and that is 
exactly why it is capable of leading the speaker out of himself, to the point where the 
listener and the listening become united (Kabat-Zinn). 
Memory, then, is directed downward, impeding the abandonment of the mind’s 
categories.  In the cleverly titled poem “Drag,” the speaker’s comment illustrates the 
heavy pull of the gravity of recollection, stating: 
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[…] It occurred to me that, 
unlike Horned Larks, who are imagination, 
I was mostly memory, which, 
though photogenic and nutritious, rich 
with old-time goodness, is notoriously 
heavier than air.  
(Camber 164, 17-22) 
And while memory can be seen as a way to subvert loneliness, ultimately it fortifies the 
barrier between what was and what is, further alienating the person remembering from 
the possibility of uniting with something outside of the self.  Anne Michaels astutely 
remarks that “[m]emory, like love, gains strength through restatement, reaffirmation; in a 
culture, [it does so ] through ritual, tradition, stories, art” (181), pointing out memory’s 
self-sustaining quality.  Memory acts like a nurse log in a forest, providing the 
groundwork for more of itself to thrive.  McKay figures this quality of memory as an 
edifice, indicating in “On Leaving” (Camber 201-202) the need  
to stop 
building and remembering and building artful 
monuments upon the memories. 
(Camber 202, ll. 26-28).   
Indeed, it is these accreted layers of memory that prevent the mind from truly engaging 
with the wilderness of the present. 
Eternity, Infinity, and “Another Gravity” 
Just as Icarus was unsuccessful because he was unable to affirm his humanness by 
finding a way of flying suitable to his position in the world, the desire to merge with that 
which is outside of ourselves is incompatible with our traditional tools for accomplishing 
this.  Don McKay’s poetics posits that a mode of attention beyond utility is required in 
order to alleviate the disparity between the desire for meaning and the ways in which it is 
sought, a mode of attention that does not favor the construct.  According to McKay, the 
problem “stems from our easy [but flawed] assumption that a definition of things under 
the heading of utility is adequate, that their being is fully explained by what they’re used 
for” (“Remembering Apparatus” 57).  This unsatisfactory premise can be ameliorated by 
recognizing “that tools exceed the fact of their construction and exemplify an otherness 
beyond human design” (“Remembering Apparatus” 57).  For McKay, this space beyond 
human categories, names, time, and memory is meaningful, ethically relevant, as well as 
rich and replete with experiences worthy of commentary, provided our understanding of 
what is considered to be “human” becomes enlarged or refined.  For this to take place, it 
is necessary to see everything—thought, plant, animal, memory—as: 
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[…] lit 
by its own small moon—a snowberry, 
a mothball, a dime—which regulates its tides 
and longings. […] 
(“Finger Pointing at the Moon,” Camber 196, ll. 32-35).   
Implying that every small thing has its own rhythms and is worthy of spotlight, or more 
precisely, moonlight, McKay emphasizes the ethical importance of recognizing the 
innumerable other gravities that are at work. 
In “Between Rock and Stone: A Geopoetic Alphabet” (2005), Don Mckay describes the 
difference between absence and the infinite, stating: “Nothing is absence under the 
auspices of eternity; zero, on the other hand, is absence which slides into mind because 
it has intimations of infinity” (126).  Infinity is endless time with subject position 
subtracted out of it, and in this sense “[t]he idea of eternity domesticates infinity, nudges 
it firmly in the direction of place and makes it habitable” (“Between Rock and Stone” 
105).  In short, the concept of “eternity” adds a dimension of ethical accountability to 
human experience, which is not a presupposition of the mere idea of “infinity.”  It is at the 
point where the mind does not see its own hand in perception that Adam awakens with a 
fright in the pre-lapsarian Garden, and that the human is no longer willingly exiled from 
the world underlying the one that is tagged with names.  The nocturnal in Don McKay’s 
poetry, with its constant shape-shifting, dematerializing abilities, undermines the 
presumed authority of the mind, and shows that indeed, “there are other worlds” (“Bone 
Poems” Camber 82, l. 13).  The uncomfortable space beyond empirical knowledge―and 
beyond the epistemological convenience of a dichotomy between self and other that 
such a mode of knowledge introduces—is one that the night forces upon the mind as the 
latter is reminded of “another gravity” that, even if unseen, remains at work.  In this 
regard, wilderness, the mind, and the nocturnal often meet at such a juncture, and 
wilderness, like the force of gravity, cannot be denied.  And once the mind begins to 
realize that the world is still the world, even when, as Dennis Lee puts it, the mind is 
“eclipsed” (43), the space between memory and experience, between earth and sky, self 
and other, and between the literal and the figurative ceases to be seen as absence.  
After all, the assumption that the natural world is dependent upon reason is, like the 
concept of zero, “a moon without metaphors” (McKay, “Between Rock and Stone” 126).   
Endnotes
                                                
1  This work was made possible by funding from the University of Calgary’s Teaching and 
Learning Funding Committee and from a fellowship furnished by the Calgary Institute for the 
Humanities. 
2  In an essay entitled “Cleopatra’s Love,” which lyrically relates memory, love, and knowledge, 
Anne Michaels describes poetry’s ability to bestow night vision, a description included in full 
here: “Parts of our selves are exposed, and like the latent image on film, develop; silver 
bromide of knowledge darkening.  A poem can give us night vision; getting used to the dark, 
we begin to make things out.  The invisible rendered visible: breath on glass” (180). 
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3  By “phenomenology,” I mean a knowledge and understanding that is “embodied,” stemming 
from David Abrams’s reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Spell of the Sensuous.  While 
it is not my immediate purpose to discuss these ideas in their full depth, my reading 
investigates how these principles are articulated in Don McKay’s poetry in relation to his 
concept of wilderness with its emphasis on eluding the mind’s appropriations.  As such, I 
focus on various aspects of this “embodied” intelligence, which according to Abrams, strives 
“not to explain the world as if from outside, but to give voice to the world from our 
experienced situation within it, recalling us to our participation in the here-and-now, 
rejuvenating our sense of wonder at the fathomless things, events and power that surround 
us on every hand” (47).  The act of reading is one of the ways whereby the self experiences 
itself and the world, which guides the ethical and experiential dimensions of McKay’s work.  
For more on Abrams’s reading of Merleau-Ponty, see Spell of the Sensuous (New York: 
Vintage, 1996), especially pages 44-72. 
4  Humanism, in this case, is defined by M.H. Abrams as a worldview that “assumed the dignity 
and central position of human beings in the universe; emphasized the importance in 
education of studying classical imaginative and philosophical literature, although with 
emphasis on its moral and practical rather than its aesthetic values; and insisted on the 
primacy, in ordering human life, of reason (considered the universal and defining human 
faculty) as opposed to the instinctual appetites and the ‘animal’ passions” (123). 
5  This is elaborated on in Paul Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor.  One instance in particular 
stands out when he writes: “John Searle postulates without hesitation the thesis that 
something must be in order that something may be identified” (219), pointing out a liability of 
Cartesian thought.   
6  Adam Dickinson thoughtfully demonstrates that the methods of science and the reliance on 
the figurative to express matter are not contradictory; in fact, paraphrasing Daniel Tiffany, he 
writes: “Indeed, Tiffany goes on to argue that scientific materialism has always depended on 
images and tropes to depict the unobservable ‘reality’ of matter.  He suggests that lyric poetry 
provides an alternate engagement with materiality precisely because of its concern with 
images and allegories” (37).  For more on the relation between science and poetry, see 
Dickinson’s essay “Lyric Ethics: Ecocriticism, Material Metaphoricity, and the Poetics of Don 
McKay and Jan Zwicky” in Canadian Poetry: Studies, Documents, Reviews 55 (Fall-Winter 
2004), 34-52. 
7  This also demonstrates that the prospect of authorial transparency remains an unattainable 
ideal, because there can be no pure, unobstructed interaction with the world without it 
somehow being altered or blown away like the dandelion seeds. 
8  Adam Dickinson emphasizes this liability of the post-structuralist approach to semiosis, 
stating “linguistic thinking, or language-dependent thought, presupposes divisions between 
things as a consequence of syntax and symbolism—as a consequence, we might say, of 
being systematically meaningful” (37). 
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